

8 Feb (5)

(Chau)

- Did VC lodge in Hanoi just to provoke destruction by US?
- " " " flag-raising by US?

- Chau: after election, shift toward apathy and (extreme) to active support of VC; thus, VC could not have carried out attacks before, now, have more help in cities. [US attacks will create more VC in cities — out of old/new refugees, students, ...]
- Hue: close to Center & North (not South): Emperor's rule over there. And NVN leaders from Center.

- Hanoi: campaign for PM.

Chau to Fulbright: When US chose to topple Diem (instead of pulling out, before or after fall) it took on great responsibility for later development. US made that the leaders it has chosen for VN do not draw the loyalty of the Vietnamese people.

"Morale is lower now than at any time — been lower than 64-65. (cities safe then).



- ARVN may lose 20%. [More? DE] May soldiers not  
care for families.

- Insecurity: Before, people in cities were safe; now, not.  
VC didn't do it earlier because could not.

- VC <sup>307</sup> led (without counting on it) General Uprising: if successful,  
Total Victory (VC were denied that!); even so, great success.

(Also: having used

- Opportunity: VNese bourgeoisie very lazy — but when  
pressed, as now, they will have to choose: for their self-interest.  
Many will leave country; many won't deal with VC; but many could  
be attracted by GVN — pushed by religious leaders, + leaders like  
Dan, Huong. (Dore organized Hanoi to avoid starvation  
in 1945).

Thien should call on Huong, Sun, Dan to help the  
people (then they have no choice) — instead of Thang!

Recovery Administration — like private org.

(Use like flood:

Self-motivate

- Put people into orgs; People's Self-Protection



Why VC push now?

VC enter Phase III when they see enemy weak 2) politically,  
or (b) militarily, or both.

VC tactics: announce 7-day truce; but press Khe Sanh;  
lead US to press GVN to shorten truce, end it in North,  
shorten it again: so VC broke truce, blamed it on US.

— PD Cohen + soldiers will leave field to check on their families.

Pacification is finished — morale low, self-confidence gone:  
need to protect cities.

Cham, Too, is surprised that VC tried this (time not ripe) and  
that it was so successful.

(Need bigger forces: to stay longer in Saigon and Hue,  
while harassing other cities: could get people with them —  
e.g. 500,000 marching — as when de Gaulle entered Paris)

Questions ahead:

What is VC penetration of : GVN  
cities  
ARVN  
sects  
students, labor, etc.



If Thieu, Ky, Americans, Legislature, work together in  
harmony (NA not necessarily following GVN line) — VC is  
trouble.

~~After~~

Did VC improve their chances for a second attempt or  
~~not~~ worsen them?

Is their support & org in cities less or more than  
before — after VC losses? What news recruiting?

Election: with Roulet, Thieu 1-1.2 million. Extra .4 million  
forced. .8 people who feel safe <sup>voting for</sup> with military

800,000 who voted for Dzu — desperate, want to end war  
on any terms (maybe  $\frac{1}{3}$  VC; yet Dzu got high proportion  
in Cham Doc, An Giang, ... Ca Tho...).

See/Hung/Ky voters: true nationalists.

Since Election: both Thieu and VC have grown in strength:

Ky people mixed up with Thieu; but many Hung/Sam  
people shift toward VC. Greater increase to VC.



Talks:

Pacification - 3 lectures

Mon. Tues.

Political Development 1

Mon.

Improving ARVN 2

Mon.

Land Reform 2

CG 2

{ Elections?

{ Impact of VC campaign

US <sup>reli.</sup> strategy

US - GVN relations

Political power structure

Net bio

Research Inst. ?



## US Strategy

- Have plan for discussion: consider, why not successful so far?

- Improve ARVN

- ~~Re~~ Redeploy ARVN/US/allied forces:

e.g. - protect populated areas: organize PSP

- harass VC in populated, keep them away from pop.

## [Dynamics: ~~robust~~

Refugees into of Saigon: back to countryside & VC.

Demoralization of officials/officers: if ~~this~~ this can lead to GVN behavior pushing people to VC.

Ky/Thien now easily influenced by US, after attacks.

People who had come from countryside that made mistakes;  
Not so much, regret at US, but:  
now, go back, or work for VC in cities. All lose all  
confidence US can protect them; will mobilize them, agitate  
them, polarize them in action camps: for GVN, for VC. If GVN  
neglects (or treats them unfairly...).



- 1) Basic reason for failure so far: <sup>§</sup> lack of participation by VNese.  
(evidence: 'difficulty getting recruits for mil.; desertion.
- 2) lack of effort of administrators at all level in reforming admin.
- 3) lack of leadership in admin, mil., political level.
- 4) Corruption, internal disputes.

2) Because of this, Allied forces become dominant.

3) Hence, people come to feel as nearly apathetic to US effort.

> 4) <sup>Hence,</sup> War fought militarily: S+D, bombing, saturating,  
> neglect of building up positive support — even in controlled area.

(Many VNese in countryside know better, but don't try hard to convince US and ARVN — think this role is secondary).

New objectives: active partic. by VNese in this gov.

1) — Much more representative gov. (Not essential K-T gov).

— Unified gov (give by definite duties)

— Enlarge gov

✓ — Independent & respected legislature

✓ — Stronger justice system

✓ — Free but responsible press (law on status of press)

(1) necessary to (2)

2) Pacify the pacified area. (using regular

improve living conditions — ~~to~~ in particular, improve



process of justice, police harassment, VC security  
(more important than physical standards).

b) Organize people for self-protection.

c) Redeploy security forces

Stop USMC "pac" (not effective); [get out of Khe Sanh...]

[Use RD Cadres to reinforce village and hamlet admin;  
use in "secure" areas.

3) Later deployment:

Cadres/police in "secure" areas

PF/RF encircling this.

ARVN ~~of US~~ prevents VC strong units from  
attacking PF/RF or population. (organized as bns <sup>full-strength</sup>).

US/Allied: protect bns; harassing enemy bns,  
reinforce/reaction for VMA.

(not pursuing local guerrillas — kill too many non-VC.  
e.g. in Delta, US to reinforce).

Bn → Paws → tactical mobile brigade

(No more div or Corps; but logistical support command.  
area commands for support.)

In 3 years with this strategy, VC accept mining role.

) "Can VC intercept?" Ans: We beat VC villages, but don't disrupt  
their org.



4) All civil functions — dual, laid upon, etc. — done with aim of stimulating & supporting people's organizations & People's Self-Protection.

Morale blacker than at any time in past.

[Hyp: (a) Many will go over to ~~the~~ VC in any case;

(b) Rest will go to VC or GVN, depending on GVN/US (or VC) actions.

But: will

("All VNese will know them would not have put Ky/Hue/Thy in charge of Recovery without US pressure — again, US supporting Northerners.")

a)  
x

Discontent with GVN enables VC to expand their org. rapidly in cities: send in weapons, agents, observers: and to organize helpers.

(a) How much support <sup>in cities</sup> did VC need to carry out attacks?

(b) ~~How~~ <sup>How</sup> ~~much~~ <sup>much</sup> support (Chau hsp), where did it appear? Why? How reverse?

Chau: Since elections; nature of gov; with broadening: possible to reverse.



[All our statistics of "progress" reflect what the VC have done lately ; not a good predictor of VC action in next 6 months

Political Impact of VC attacks:

- 1) going to VC as result of fear of VC
- 2) more vulnerable to VC influence, more security for VC (since people will be less willing to inform on VC, refuse cooperation — knowing VC can retaliate). i.e. easier

Since VC penetration of SVN much greater than GVN penetration of VC, grassroots contact — so it is much safer to coop with VC than gov. (VPA in French Zone Bureau — to kill prisoners, like

— What should our advisory presence be in VN?

[ Battalion liaison — not advisors ;...

much more professional — better paid — police advisors.



country; but kept very close contact with VNese; had VNese working for them at all levels

Line not being concerned with maintaining "independent sovereignty" of VN — with effort of closely advising from VNese, now intimate contact

Final: Never called again "advisor"; in 1952, order for VNese units

Now, officials at all levels <sup>much</sup> less respectable; in fact, less motivation, because of improper US interference. I

(Claim vs. integration: a) Need, in this war, for VNese motivation, participation, unlike Korea; (b) resistance of VNese, politicized by years.

If US takes over war, integrates ARVN; VC will fight harder, thinking they are on right track; US could win this way, if it could keep fighting despite US public, world opinion.

Dick Fortin

Claim: Khe Sanh as diversion to keep US up north

A month ago, expected several provincial capitals to be overrun within a month — because VC was concentrating the contested areas — penetrating, moving...

Why? Because ARVN was concentrating on RD areas — and US was off in bases, borders [no one in middle areas, contiguous to pop.] (+ RD areas not major pop., anyway)



US choice: 1) hitting bases: hasn't worked.

2) only protect US bases — VC takes over rural. (3) both bases and surrounding rural — build up RVN base.



" French were in VN for 100 years — yet they always felt necessary to maintain a respectable VN facade of leadership — to maintain access to VN pop (with small number of troops). They had colonial intent — yet maintained reserve. They had a deep professional understanding of country; but kept very close contact with VNese; had VNese working for them at all levels.

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With 2 million troops in South, US wins, with or without integration. (to invade, <sup>NVN</sup> / will move).

But why integrate, to improve ARVN?

- a) Training for dependents: e.g. junior off, NCO's.
- b) Clean up frontier system, with post effects
- c) Death/injured benefits for dependents
- d) reduce inequalities between senior/junior ranks.

(though too complicated)

On HES: index of "current security", ~~or~~ control: not index of "pacification" — i.e. org/commitment of people, ability to maintain security in absence of troops (e.g. if troops were removed, to work elsewhere).

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In 3 years, VC acquires mighty role.

Now, Ho may want US to increase troops — in North, bases — but not invade. Thus, threaten K.S., don't attack. Get a new President; go into negot in strength.

[By (2) concentrating on K.S., ~~USA~~ (b) "attrition" strategy, and (c) sending more troops: US may play into Ho's hands as neatly as the French played into the German hands in WWI, Schlieffen Plan, "swing door."

[Use attack to evaluate HES (and intell, warning system: comparatively. e.g. CG). What was rating for... Ben Tre...

